Provided by: libguestfs0t64_1.52.0-5ubuntu3_amd64 
名前
guestfs-security - security of libguestfs
説明
This manual page discusses security implications of using libguestfs, particularly with untrusted or
malicious guests or disk images.
REPORTING SECURITY PROBLEMS
If you wish to privately report a security issue, please follow the Red Hat security procedure at
https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact
If the security problem is not so serious, you can simply file a bug (see "BUGS" below), or send an email
to our mailing list (https://lists.libguestfs.org). You do not need to subscribe to the mailing list to
send email, but there will be a delay while the message is moderated.
GENERAL ISSUES
Security of mounting filesystems
You should never mount an untrusted guest filesystem directly on your host kernel (eg. using loopback or
kpartx).
When you mount a filesystem, mistakes in the kernel filesystem (VFS) can be escalated into exploits by
attackers creating a malicious filesystem. These exploits are very severe for two reasons. Firstly
there are very many filesystem drivers in the kernel, and many of them are infrequently used and not much
developer attention has been paid to the code. Linux userspace helps potential crackers by detecting the
filesystem type and automatically choosing the right VFS driver, even if that filesystem type is
unexpected. Secondly, a kernel-level exploit is like a local root exploit (worse in some ways), giving
immediate and total access to the system right down to the hardware level.
These exploits can be present in the kernel for a very long time (https://lwn.net/Articles/538898/).
Libguestfs provides a layered approach to protecting you from exploits:
untrusted filesystem
--------------------------------------
appliance kernel
--------------------------------------
qemu process running as non-root
--------------------------------------
sVirt [if using libvirt + SELinux]
--------------------------------------
host kernel
We run a Linux kernel inside a qemu virtual machine, usually running as a non-root user. The attacker
would need to write a filesystem which first exploited the kernel, and then exploited either qemu
virtualization (eg. a faulty qemu driver) or the libguestfs protocol, and finally to be as serious as the
host kernel exploit it would need to escalate its privileges to root. Additionally if you use the
libvirt back end and SELinux, sVirt is used to confine the qemu process. This multi-step escalation,
performed by a static piece of data, is thought to be extremely hard to do, although we never say ‘never’
about security issues.
Callers can also reduce the attack surface by forcing the filesystem type when mounting (use
"guestfs_mount_vfs" in guestfs(3)).
General security considerations
Be careful with any files or data that you download from a guest (by "download" we mean not just the
"guestfs_download" in guestfs(3) command but any command that reads files, filenames, directories or
anything else from a disk image). An attacker could manipulate the data to fool your program into doing
the wrong thing. Consider cases such as:
• データ（ファイルなど）が存在しない場合
• 存在するが空の場合
• 通常よりもかなり大きい場合
• 任意の 8 ビットのデータを含む場合
• 予期しない文字エンコードを使用している場合
• 同型異義語を含む場合
Protocol security
プロトコルは、定義されたメッセージ上限容量を持つ RFC 4506 (XDR) に基づき、セキュアであるように設計されて
います。しかしながら、libguestfs を使用するプログラムは気をつけなければいけません - たとえば、ディスクイ
メージからバイナリーをダウンロードして、ローカルに実行するプログラムを書くことができます。また、多くのプ
ロトコルセキュリティは結果からあなたを保護しません。
Inspection security
Parts of the inspection API (see "INSPECTION" in guestfs(3)) return untrusted strings directly from the
guest, and these could contain any 8 bit data. Callers should be careful to escape these before printing
them to a structured file (for example, use HTML escaping if creating a web page).
Guest configuration may be altered in unusual ways by the administrator of the virtual machine, and may
not reflect reality (particularly for untrusted or actively malicious guests). For example we parse the
hostname from configuration files like /etc/sysconfig/network that we find in the guest, but the guest
administrator can easily manipulate these files to provide the wrong hostname.
The inspection API parses guest configuration using two external libraries: Augeas (Linux configuration)
and hivex (Windows Registry). Both are designed to be robust in the face of malicious data, although
denial of service attacks are still possible, for example with oversized configuration files.
Running untrusted guest commands
Be very cautious about running commands from the guest. By running a command in the guest, you are
giving CPU time to a binary that you do not control, under the same user account as the library, albeit
wrapped in qemu virtualization. More information and alternatives can be found in "RUNNING COMMANDS" in
guestfs(3).
HISTORICAL SECURITY ISSUES IN LIBGUESTFS
CVE-2010-3851
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/642934
このセキュリティバグは、QEMU のディスクイメージでないことをディスクの自動フォーマット検出に関するもので
す。
A raw disk image is just the raw bytes, there is no header. Other disk images like qcow2 contain a
special header. Qemu deals with this by looking for one of the known headers, and if none is found then
assuming the disk image must be raw.
This allows a guest which has been given a raw disk image to write some other header. At next boot (or
when the disk image is accessed by libguestfs) qemu would do autodetection and think the disk image
format was, say, qcow2 based on the header written by the guest.
This in itself would not be a problem, but qcow2 offers many features, one of which is to allow a disk
image to refer to another image (called the "backing disk"). It does this by placing the path to the
backing disk into the qcow2 header. This path is not validated and could point to any host file (eg.
"/etc/passwd"). The backing disk is then exposed through "holes" in the qcow2 disk image, which of
course is completely under the control of the attacker.
In libguestfs this is rather hard to exploit except under two circumstances:
1. ネットワークを有効化しているか、もしくは書き込みモードでディスクを開いています。
2. You are also running untrusted code from the guest (see "RUNNING COMMANDS" in guestfs(3)).
The way to avoid this is to specify the expected disk format when adding disks (the optional "format"
option to "guestfs_add_drive_opts" in guestfs(3)). You should always do this if the disk is raw format,
and it’s a good idea for other cases too. (See also "DISK IMAGE FORMATS" in guestfs(3)).
For disks added from libvirt using calls like "guestfs_add_domain" in guestfs(3), the format is fetched
from libvirt and passed through.
For libguestfs tools, use the --format command line parameter as appropriate.
CVE-2011-4127
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/752375
This is a bug in the kernel which allowed guests to overwrite parts of the host’s drives which they
should not normally have access to.
It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version ≥ 1.16 which contains a change that mitigates the
problem.
CVE-2012-2690
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/831117
Old versions of both virt-edit and the guestfish "edit" command created a new file containing the changes
but did not set the permissions, etc of the new file to match the old one. The result of this was that
if you edited a security sensitive file such as /etc/shadow then it would be left world-readable after
the edit.
It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version ≥ 1.16.
CVE-2013-2124
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/968306
This security bug was a flaw in inspection where an untrusted guest using a specially crafted file in the
guest OS could cause a double-free in the C library (denial of service).
It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not vulnerable: libguestfs ≥ 1.20.8, ≥ 1.22.2
or ≥ 1.23.2.
CVE-2013-4419
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016960
When using the guestfish(1) --remote or guestfish --listen options, guestfish would create a socket in a
known location (/tmp/.guestfish-$UID/socket-$PID).
The location has to be a known one in order for both ends to communicate. However no checking was done
that the containing directory (/tmp/.guestfish-$UID) is owned by the user. Thus another user could
create this directory and potentially hijack sockets owned by another user’s guestfish client or server.
It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not vulnerable: libguestfs ≥ 1.20.12, ≥ 1.22.7
or ≥ 1.24.
Denial of service when inspecting disk images with corrupt btrfs volumes
It was possible to crash libguestfs (and programs that use libguestfs as a library) by presenting a disk
image containing a corrupt btrfs volume.
This was caused by a NULL pointer dereference causing a denial of service, and is not thought to be
exploitable any further.
See commit d70ceb4cbea165c960710576efac5a5716055486 for the fix. This fix is included in libguestfs
stable branches ≥ 1.26.0, ≥ 1.24.6 and ≥ 1.22.8, and also in RHEL ≥ 7.0. Earlier versions of libguestfs
are not vulnerable.
CVE-2014-0191
Libguestfs previously used unsafe libxml2 APIs for parsing libvirt XML. These APIs defaulted to allowing
network connections to be made when certain XML documents were presented. Using a malformed XML document
it was also possible to exhaust all CPU, memory or file descriptors on the machine.
Since the libvirt XML comes from a trusted source (the libvirt daemon) it is not thought that this could
have been exploitable.
This was fixed in libguestfs ≥ 1.27.9 and the fix was backported to stable versions ≥ 1.26.2, ≥ 1.24.9, ≥
1.22.10 and ≥ 1.20.13.
Shellshock (bash CVE-2014-6271)
This bash bug indirectly affects libguestfs. For more information see:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2014-September/msg00252.html
CVE-2014-8484
CVE-2014-8485
These two bugs in binutils affect the GNU strings(1) program, and thus the "guestfs_strings" in
guestfs(3) and "guestfs_strings_e" in guestfs(3) APIs in libguestfs. Running strings on an untrusted
file could cause arbitrary code execution (confined to the libguestfs appliance).
In libguestfs ≥ 1.29.5 and ≥ 1.28.3, libguestfs uses the "strings" -a option to avoid BFD parsing on the
file.
CVE-2015-5745
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1251157
This is not a vulnerability in libguestfs, but because we always give a virtio-serial port to each guest
(since that is how guest-host communication happens), an escalation from the appliance to the host qemu
process is possible. This could affect you if:
• your libguestfs program runs untrusted programs out of the guest (using "guestfs_sh" in guestfs(3)
etc), or
• another exploit was found in (for example) kernel filesystem code that allowed a malformed filesystem
to take over the appliance.
If you use sVirt to confine qemu, that would thwart some attacks.
Permissions of .ssh and .ssh/authorized_keys
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1260778
The tools virt-customize(1), virt-sysprep(1) and virt-builder(1) have an --ssh-inject option for
injecting an SSH key into virtual machine disk images. They may create a ~user/.ssh directory and
~user/.ssh/authorized_keys file in the guest to do this.
In libguestfs < 1.31.5 and libguestfs < 1.30.2, the new directory and file would get mode 0755 and mode
0644 respectively. However these permissions (especially for ~user/.ssh) are wider than the permissions
that OpenSSH uses. In current libguestfs, the directory and file are created with mode 0700 and mode
0600.
CVE-2015-8869
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2015-8869
This vulnerability in OCaml might affect virt tools written in the OCaml programming language. It
affects only 64 bit platforms. Because this bug affects code generation it is difficult to predict which
precise software could be affected, and therefore our recommendation is that you recompile libguestfs
using a version of the OCaml compiler where this bug has been fixed (or ask your Linux distro to do the
same).
CVE-2017-5208, CVE-2017-5331, CVE-2017-5332, CVE-2017-5333, CVE-2017-6009, CVE-2017-6010, CVE-2017-6011
Multiple vulnerabilities in the wrestool(1) program in the "icoutils" package can be exploited for local
code execution on the host.
When libguestfs inspection (see "Inspection security" above) detects a Windows XP or Windows 7 guest and
is asked to find an associated icon for the guest, it will download an untrusted file from the guest and
run "wrestool -x" on that file. This can lead to local code execution on the host. Any disk image or
guest can be crafted to look like a Windows guest to libguestfs inspection, so just because you do not
have Windows guests does not help.
Any program calling the libguestfs API "guestfs_inspect_get_icon" could be vulnerable. This includes
virt-inspector(1) and virt-manager(1).
The solution is to update to the non-vulnerable version of icoutils (at least 0.31.1).
CVE-2017-7244, CVE-2017-7245, CVE-2017-7246
Multiple vulnerabilities in PCRE could be exploited to crash libguestfs (ie. cause a denial of service)
when performing inspection on an untrusted virtual machine.
The solution is to update to a version of PCRE with these bugs fixed (upstream version ≥ 8.41).
CVE-2018-11806
Vulnerabilities affecting qemu user networking (SLIRP) allow a malicious filesystem image to take control
of qemu and from there attack the host.
This affects libguestfs when the backend is set to "direct" and networking is enabled.
The direct backend is the default upstream, but not in some downstream Linux distributions including
Fedora, Red Hat Enterprise Linux and CentOS. It might also have been selected if you set the
"LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct" environment variable or called "guestfs_set_backend (g, "direct")".
Networking is enabled automatically by some tools (eg. virt-builder(1)), or is enabled if your code
called "guestfs_set_network (g, 1)" (which is not the default).
The libvirt backend is not affected.
The solution is to update qemu to a version containing the fix (see
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg01012.html).
CVE-2022-2211
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2022-2211
The "get_keys" function in libguestfs-common/options/keys.c collects those --key options from the command
line into a new array that match a particular block device that's being decrypted for inspection. The
function intends to size the result array such that potentially all --key options, plus a terminating
"NULL" element, fit into it. The code mistakenly uses the "MIN" macro instead of "MAX", and therefore
only one element is allocated before the "NULL" terminator.
Passing precisely two --key ID:... options on the command line for the encrypted block device "ID" causes
"get_keys" to overwrite the terminating "NULL", leading to an out-of-bounds read in "decrypt_mountables",
file libguestfs-common/options/decrypt.c.
Passing more than two --key ID:... options on the command line for the encrypted block device "ID" causes
"get_keys" itself to perform out-of-bounds writes. The most common symptom is a crash with "SIGSEGV"
later on.
This issue affects -- broadly speaking -- all libguestfs-based utilities that accept --key, namely:
"guestfish", "guestmount", "virt-cat", "virt-customize", "virt-diff", "virt-edit", "virt-get-kernel",
"virt-inspector", "virt-log", "virt-ls", "virt-sparsify", "virt-sysprep", "virt-tail", "virt-v2v".
関連項目
guestfs(3), guestfs-internals(1), guestfs-release-notes(1), guestfs-testing(1), http://libguestfs.org/.
著者
Richard W.M. Jones ("rjones at redhat dot com")
COPYRIGHT
Copyright (C) 2009-2023 Red Hat Inc.
LICENSE
BUGS
To get a list of bugs against libguestfs, use this link:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/buglist.cgi?component=libguestfs&product=Virtualization+Tools
To report a new bug against libguestfs, use this link:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/enter_bug.cgi?component=libguestfs&product=Virtualization+Tools
When reporting a bug, please supply:
• The version of libguestfs.
• Where you got libguestfs (eg. which Linux distro, compiled from source, etc)
• Describe the bug accurately and give a way to reproduce it.
• Run libguestfs-test-tool(1) and paste the complete, unedited output into the bug report.
libguestfs-1.52.0 2024-01-05 guestfs-security(1)